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Abstract. Broadly speaking an individual can invest time and effort to
avoid becoming victim to a cyber attack and/or they can invest resource
in recovering from any attack. We introduce a new game called the pre-
vention and recovery game to study this trade-off. We report results from
the experimental lab that allow us to categorize different approaches to
risk taking. We show that many individuals appear relatively risk lov-
ing in that they invest in recovery rather than prevention. We find little
difference in behavior between a gain and loss framing.
Keywords: cyber-security · ransomware · insurance · recovery · risk
aversion.
1 Introduction
Cyber-crime is a growing threat to society that will become increasingly im-
portant as reliance on technology grows (e.g. through the internet of things).
Extensive evidence suggests, however, that individuals and organizations (both
private and public) take excessive risk in cyber-space. Indeed, there are simple
and low cost behaviors, such as two factor authentication and regular offline
back-ups, that would dramatically decrease the likelihood and costs of a cyber-
attack. Yet many individuals, employees and managers do not routinely follow
such behavior [1]. An analogy would be a society in which we all rely on cars and
yet leave them unlocked with the key in the ignition. A fundamental question is
why we observe such risk taking?
In looking at an individual’s approach to cyber-security we distinguish be-
tween prevention and recovery [2]. We view prevention as decisions enacted before
? This research was funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
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an attack with the objective of reducing the likelihood and/or damage from at-
tack. Regular software updates, anti-malware and two factor authentication are
primarily aimed at preventing an attack from being ‘successful’. Similarly, regu-
lar offline-back ups and insurance can prevent an attack from causing significant
damage. We view recovery as decisions enacted after an attack. For instance,
they may have to reset passwords, reformat hard drives or pay for an IT company
to recover data and restore systems.
While prevention and recovery are not mutually exclusive we can delineate
a strategy that focuses, consciously or not, on prevention and one that focuses
on recovery.4 As a case in point consider ransomware. Crypto-ransomware is a
relatively new form of malware in which an individual’s files are encrypted and
a ransom is demanded for the key to decrypt the files [5–7]. If the encryption
is done in a technically sound way then the files are only recoverable by paying
the ransom. Crypto-ransomware provides, therefore, a viable business model
for criminals and some variants of ransomware have a ‘good reputation’ for
returning files to victims (if the ransom is paid) [8–10]. In another, older variant,
of ransomware victims are held to ransom for the release of sensitive information
[11].
Consider an individual who stores sensitive information on her computer and
is aware of the threat of ransomware. Broadly speaking the individual has two
options. She can limit the damage from attack through, say, regular back-ups
or insurance against loss. Or she can pay the ransom if attacked in order to try
and recover her files. Law enforcement clearly encourage individuals to take the
former approach. It would seem, however, that many take the latter approach.
For instance, estimates of the proportion of individuals paying the ransom are
as high as 40% [12]. To focus on recovery rather than prevention would appear
to be risk-taking behaviour.
Evidence from the field of behavioural economics suggests that individuals
are more risk seeking in the loss domain than the gain domain [13]. That is, they
are more willing to take risks to regain ‘losses’ than to earn ‘gains’. This would
appear to be relevant in a cyber context. For instance, an individual who has
‘lost’ files to a ransom attack may be willing to take a risk in paying the ransom.
We also know that perception of loss and gain is sensitive to framing [14, 15]. A
growing body of literature has explored the effectiveness of using different frames
to influence behaviour [16–18]. These studies suggest that loss aversion can be a
factor in shaping individual choice.
The relevance of framing for cyber-security is well acknowledged in the aca-
demic literature [19–25].5 However, prior studies have focused, using our termi-
nology, on either prevention or recovery. In our paper we explore prevention and
recovery in tandem. This opens us interesting new avenues for exploration. In
4 One can also delineate strategies that focus on different aspects of prevention or
recovery. For instance [3, 4] compare protection versus insurance, where the former
lowers the probability of attack and the latter the damage from attack.
5 It is also, arguably, acknowledged (consciously or not) by cyber-criminals with ran-
somware demands threatening the permanent destruction of files etc.
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particular, we can check for consistency of behaviour across the two different
decision tasks. For instance, do individuals who take risks in terms of prevention
also take risks in terms of recovery. Indeed, can it be optimal for an individual
to spend on recovery and yet not spend on prevention?
We introduce a new game that captures investment on prevention and recov-
ery in a cyber-security context. The game contains four stages in which individ-
uals invest in prevention against a cyber attack, learn if they are attacked, can
spend on recovery if attacked, and then learn if they have regained their files.
We explore how behavior is likely to be influenced by a gain or loss frame. We
show that an individual is predicted to invest more on recovery in the loss frame
than gain frame. Conversely, she is predicted to invest more on prevention in a
gain frame than loss frame.
We then report an experiment designed to test the hypotheses of our model.
We find only limited support that framing matters. More noteworthy is the large
heterogeneity of behavior. A significant proportion of subjects invest mainly in
prevention, some mainly in recovery, and then some in both or neither. Moreover,
we see a lot of risk taking behavior. The behavior we observe in the lab would
seem relatively consistent with that in the field. We argue, therefore, that our
game and experimental design can be extended to further explore the trade-off
between prevention and recovery.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the game,
section 3 contains our theoretical results, section 4 presents our experimental
results, and section 5 concludes. Supplementary material, including experiment
instructions and data, is available on Figshare (https://dmu.figshare.com/).
2 The prevention and recovery game
In this section we introduce a simple game designed to capture salient aspects
of the choice between preventing and recovering from cyber-attack. The game
consists of four stages. In the first stage, the prevention stage, the individual
can spend resource to insure against attack. In the second stage Nature deter-
mines if the individual is attacked. In the third stage, the recovery stage, the
individual can, if attacked, spend resource on trying to recover her files. In the
fourth stage nature determines if the losses are recovered. The game is carefully
designed so that we can distinguish different potential influences on behavior.
We now explain each stage in more detail.
The individual has computer files worth V tokens. In Stage 1 of the game
the individual chooses how much to spend on preventing loss from cyber-attack.
She can spend any amount up to I tokens, where I is exogenously given. Let
I ∈ [0, I] denote the amount allocated to prevention.
In Stage 2 the individual may suffer a cyber-attack that means she loses the
files worth V .6 The probability of attack is given by max
{
100p−I
100−I , 0
}
where p is
6 Here we assume that all attacks are ‘successful’. It would be equivalent to allow for
deterrence and distinguish between successful and unsuccessful attacks.
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an exogenous parameter capturing the activities of the criminal and factors in
place to deter attack. In interpretation, we note that if the individual does not
spend on preventing loss, I = 0, the probability of attack is p. If the individual
spends I = 100p on prevention then the probability of attack is 0. Thus, the
more spent on preventing loss (in Stage 1 of the game) the lower the probability
of attack.
To make the analysis sharper we assume that resources allocated to preven-
tion are not sunk. This is consistent with compensation for spending on preven-
tion if attacked. For instance, the individual may not need to pay a cyber-security
provider if they are attacked. The payoff of the individual at the end of stage 2
is, therefore, 0 if she is attacked and V − I if she is not attacked. Note that if
the individual fully prevents attack her payoff is V − 100p. If the individual is
not attacked then the game ends. If she is attacked then we proceed to stage 3.
In stage 3 the individual has the opportunity to recover her losses. Specifically
she can allocate resource to recovery. She can denote any amount up to R, where
R is exogenously given. Let R ∈ [0, R] denote the amount allocated to recovery.
In Stage 4 the individual can recover her files. The probability of the indi-
vidual recovering her files is given by R/100. So, if the individual devotes no
resource to recovery she has no chance of recovering her losses. If she spends
R then she has an R% chance of recovering her files. The final payoff of the
individual is given by V − R if the files are recovered and −R if they are not.
Note that money spent on recovery is sunk and so paid irrespective of whether
the file is recovered. This captures the notion of paying a ransom to a criminal
who may or may not honour their part of the bargain.
A strategy for the individual details the amount of resources allocated to
preventing loss, I, and the amount that will be spent on recovery, R, in the
event of attack. The strategy space is, therefore, [0, I]× [0, R].7
3 Theory
We begin with some preliminary definitions. A prospect (x1, q1;x2, q2; ...;xn, qn)
lists a set of n possible outcomes x1, ..., xn and the probability of each outcome
q1, ..., qn (where
∑
i pi = 1) [26]. The expected value of a prospect (x1, q1; ...;xn, qn)
is given by
∑n
i=1 xiqi. The expected deviation from expected value is given by∑n
i=1 |xi− e|qi where e is expected value. We say that a prospect is a sure thing
if n = 1 and a risky prospect if n > 1.
Consider two prospects, A = (xA1 , q
A
1 ; ...;x
A
n , q
A
n ) and B = (x
B
1 , q
B
1 ; ...;x
B
m, q
B
m).
Suppose that A and B have the same expected value and B has a smaller ex-
pected deviation from expected value. Adopting standard terminology (without
being constrained to a particular functional form) we say that an individual is
risk averse (on domain A,B) if she prefers prospect B to A, is risk loving if she
prefers A to B and is risk neutral if she is indifferent between A and B. Note
that this definition is agnostic on whether risk aversion is due to curvature of
7 If I = 100p then attack is impossible and so, theoretically, there is a redundancy in
choosing R in this case.
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the utility function and/or loss aversion [27]. It merely says that a risk averse
individual prefers more certainty.
We further distinguish between gains and losses. We say that a prospect is on
the gain domain if the expected value is positive and on the loss domain if the
expected value is negative. This terminology allows us to capture a reflection
effect in which an individual is risk averse on the gain domain (would prefer
prospect B to A if the expected value of the prospects is positive) and risk
loving on the loss domain (would prefer prospect A to B if the expected value
of the prospect is negative) [13].
To solve for the optimal strategy of the individual in the prevention and
recovery game we proceed by backward induction. This means we start by solving
the optimal strategy in the recovery stage and then (knowing what will happen
in the recovery stage) solve for the optimal strategy in the prevention stage.
3.1 Recovery stage
Crucially, the prevention and recovery game is designed so that incentives and
payoffs in the recovery stage, stage 3, are independent of the choice of I in
the prevention stage, stage 1. We can, thus, analyze the recovery stage in a
relatively straightforward way without taking into account I. In the recovery
stage the individual has been attacked and simply has to decide how much to
spend on recovery. Inspired by the evidence of loss aversion and reflection effect
we hypothesize that attitudes to risk and, therefore, willingness to spend on
recovery will be influenced by framing and the reference point. We contrast two
possibilities.
In a gain frame we think of 0 as the status-quo. This implies that the individ-
ual has already internalized the loss of her files and so is now in the mindset of po-
tentially regaining them. To choose R is to choose prospect (V −R, r;−R, 1−r),
where r = R/100. In other words there is probability r of recovering the files
and having payoff V −R and probability 1−r of non-recovery and having payoff
−R. Our game is set up in such a way that if V = 100 a risk neutral individual is
indifferent as to how much she spends on recovery. Specifically, setting V = 100,
the expected value from spending R on recovery is
EV (R) = V × R
100
−R = 0. (1)
Note that, in this case, expected value is independent of R.
To investigate the incentives of an individual who is not risk neutral let us
contrast the choice of R = 0 and R. Throughout we fix V = 100. If the individual
chooses R = 0 then her final payoff is 0; so she has sure prospect (0, 1). If she
chooses R = R then she has r = R/100% chance of recovering her files and
getting payoff V − R and a (1 − r)% chance of not recovering her files and
getting payoff −R; so she has prospect (V − R, r;−R, 1 − r). The individual,
therefore, has a choice between a sure thing and a risky prospect (with the same
expected value). So, a risk averse individual would set R = 0 and a risk loving
individual would set R = R.
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In a loss frame we think of −V as the status-quo. This implies that the
individual has not accepted the loss of her file and so sees recovery as a way to
avoid the loss. Specifically, if she spends nothing on recovery she has sure loss
(−V, 1). If she spends R on recovery she faces prospect (−R, r;−V − R, 1− r).
Again, if V = 100, a risk neutral individual is indifferent as to her choice of R,
a risk averse individual would set R = 0 and a risk loving individual would set
R = R.
The preceding discussion leads to our first result.
Proposition 1. If V = 100 an individual who is risk averse will allocate no
resource to recovery while an individual who is risk loving will allocate the max-
imum resource to recovery.
The reflection effect suggests that individuals will be risk averse in the gain
frame and risk loving in the loss frame. Thus, there is a tendency towards R = 0
in the gain frame and R = R in the loss frame. We, therefore, obtain a testable
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 In a gain frame individuals will invest less in recovery than do
individuals in a loss frame.
3.2 Prevention stage
The optimal choice in the prevention stage, stage 1, will depend on what the
individual is going to choose in the recovery stage, stage 3. From Proposition 1
we know that (unless the individual is risk neutral) the optimal strategy in the
recovery stage will be to choose either R = 0 or R = R. Using a gain and loss
frame we will consider each possibility in turn.
In a gain frame the status quo is to have 0 payoff meaning that the individual
has not internalized the ownership of the files. So to not be attacked would be a
gain. Similarly, to recover the files would be a gain. Suppose that the individual
would choose R = 0 in stage 3. This means that she makes no attempt to
recover her files in the case of being attacked. Her expected value in stage 1,
setting V = 100, is therefore
EV (I) = (V − I)×
(
1− 100p− I
100− I
)
= 100(1− p). (2)
Again, a risk neutral individual is indifferent as to how much to spend on pre-
vention.
To progress further contrast the two extremes of I = 0 and I = V p. If the
individual chooses I = 0 then there is a p chance they are attacked and have
payoff 0 and a 1 − p chance they have payoff V . To not allocate to prevention
is, therefore, to choose a risky prospect (0, p;V, 1− p). If the individual chooses
I = V p then she has final payoff of V (1 − p). To fully prevent is, therefore, to
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choose sure prospect (V (1 − p), 1). Thus, if V = 100 a risk averse individual
would set I = V p and a risk loving individual would set I = 0.
Next suppose that the individual would choose R = R in stage 3. You can
verify that the expected value is still V (1 − p) and so independent of I. To
set I = V p is still to choose sure prospect (V (1 − p), 1) and so will appeal to
someone who is risk averse. To set I = 0 is now to choose over a risky prospect
with possible payoffs −R, V −R and V . This will appeal to someone who is risk
loving.
In a loss frame the status-quo is to have V meaning that the individual
has internalized ownership of the file. So to be attacked would be a loss. The
preceding analysis follows through independent of the frame. But we do need
to reconsider the interpretation of fully preventing attack. If the individual sets
I = V p then she has a sure loss of V p relative to her status-quo. This compares
to a sure gain of V (1−p) in the gain frame. The reflection effect would, therefore,
point to more risk loving behavior in the loss frame. This leads to our second
result and hypothesis.
Proposition 2. If V = 100 an individual who is risk averse will allocate max-
imum resource to prevention while an individual who is risk loving will allocate
nothing to prevention.
Hypothesis 2 In the gain frame individuals will invest more on prevention than
in the loss frame.
3.3 Summary
Our two propositions and two hypotheses are summarized in Table 1. Overall
we expect a risk averse individual would allocate resource to prevention rather
than recovery while a risk loving individual would allocate resource to recovery
rather than prevention. Moreover, we predict that in the gain frame individuals
are more likely to be risk averse than in the loss frame. We now proceed to an
experiment designed to test these predictions.
Table 1. Behaviour in the prevention and recovery game.
Attitudes Prevention Recovery Framing
Risk averse I = 100p R = 0 Gain
Risk loving I = 0 R = R Loss
4 Experiment
The Experiment consisted of 20 rounds and was conducted in computer rooms
at the University of Kent. Participants were recruited from the general student
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population and did not have experience in participating in an individual risk
taking experiment. In total 77 participants were recruited, with ages ranging
from 18 to 41, 49 of which were female. At the end of the experiment, 2 rounds
of the 20 rounds were selected to be paid in cash. 20 tokens were converted
to £1. All participants were given an additional £5 show-up fee. The average
final earnings were £10.01. All tasks in the experiment were computerized using
z-Tree [29].
In each round participants first performed a short real effort task in which
they ‘earned’ a file worth 100 tokens. The task was to solve a travelling salesman
problem (TSP) by finding a path between 10 points less than a pre-defined
distance. The task was set up in such a way that it was easily solved. Even so,
we expected that completing the task may give subjects more ownership over
the ‘file’ and corresponding 100 tokens. An example of a completed file is shown
in figure 1. A further benefit of using the (TSP) is that it gives us additional
data on participants in terms of route length. This could be seen as a measure
of engagement with the experiment.
Fig. 1. An example of a completed TSP task
After completing the TSP participants played the prevention and recovery
game outlined above. We set p = 0.5 and R = 50. This choice of parameters
was designed to give maximal variation in risk. In particular, a subject could
choose (in both the prevention and recovery stages) between a sure thing or a
prospect with a 50-50 risk profile. In interpretation, p = 0.5 means there was a
50% chance of attack in the event of no prevention. This is consistent with an
individual who does nothing to prevent attack having a relatively high chance
of being attacked. Setting R = 50 means that an individual has at most a 50%
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chance of recovering files after attack. This is consistent with the notion that
there is no guarantee files can be recovered after an attack.
In the experiment we consider a relatively continuous choice set in that sub-
jects could allocate any integer amount to prevention, from 0 to 50, and to
recovery, also from 0 to 50. In each round participants were asked to make their
recovery choice without having been informed of the outcome of the prevention
stage. This gives us additional data in that we see the recovery choice of the
subject in every round (even if they were not attacked). At the end of the round
participants were given full feedback on the outcome in that round (whether
they were attacked and whether they recovered their files) before they moved
onto the next round.
Fig. 2. An example of the prevention stage in the game (investing 10 tokens to prevent
the file from attack; I = 10)
Note that in this experiment we deliberately used a cyber-security frame that
explicitly talked of files, cyber-attack and recovery etc. The experimental inter-
face was also designed in a way to make the probability of attack and recovery
as transparent as possible. Specifically, in the prevention stage participants were
presented with a box with 100 balls on their computer screen, 50 of them red and
50 blue. For each token a participant put in a ‘cyber-security account’ a red ball
was removed from the box (see figure 2 for an example). Once the participant
had confirmed their choice the computer randomly selected a ball from those
remaining. If the selected ball is red, the file would be attacked. If the selected
ball is blue, the file would not be attacked.
In the prevention stage participants were presented a box with 100 brown
balls. For each token the participant put in a ‘recovery account’ one brown ball
was replaced with a green ball (see figure 3 for an example). Once the participant
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had confirmed their choice the computer randomly selected a ball from the box.
If the selected ball was brown the file was not recovered and if it was green it
was. Note that the visual approach just described, for both the prevention and
recovery stage, matches the incentives the in the recovery and prevention game.
For example, if I = 10 in the prevention stage then 10 red balls are removed and
the probability of attack becomes (50− I)/(100− I) = 4/9. Similarly, if R = 10
in the recovery stage then the probability of recovery is R/100 = 1/10.
Fig. 3. An example of the recovery stage in the game
We ran two treatments corresponding to a gain and loss frame. The treat-
ments differed only in the instructions provided to subjects. The key differences
are illustrated in Table 2. The gain frame emphasizes the potential to gain 100
tokens by keeping or recovering the file. By contrast, the loss frame emphasizes
the potential to lose the 100 tokens. Note that a subject was only exposed to one
of the treatments - gain or loss. At the end of each treatment, we include two
additional sets of questionnaires. One is a domain specific risk taking (DoSpeRT)
task [28], the other includes demographic questions and a survey on attitudes
towards ransomware. The two framings allows us to test Hypotheses 1 and 2
while data on risk attitudes allows us to explore Propositions 1 and 3.
4.1 Results
Let us look first at the average amount invested in prevention and recovery.
Table 3 reports the mean and median amount of tokens participants invested in
prevention and recovery. Figure 4 presents a box-plot of spending in prevention
and recovery. The conditional R box controls for subjects who fully prevent
(and so the recovery decision is irrelevant). We find that in the gain treatment
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Table 2. Comparison of two framings - gain and loss.
Prevention stage Recovery stage
Gain “... If you are not attacked, you will
not lose access to the file and so it
is still worth 100 Tokens.”
“... If the selected ball is green, your
files are recovered. You regain the
100 Tokens.”
Loss “... If you are attacked, you will lose
access to the file saved in stage 1
and so it becomes worthless. You
therefore, lose the 100 Tokens.”
“... If the selected ball is brown, you
do not recover your file. The 100
Tokens are lost.”
investment in prevention is significantly higher than investment in recovery (p <
0.05, two-sided Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank test with individual average
as unit observations). By contrast, in the loss treatment there is no significant
difference (p > 0.1). This leads to our first experimental result.
Result 1. Participants invested more in prevention than recovery in the gain
treatment. There is no significant difference between investment in prevention
and recovery in the loss treatment.
Table 3. Investment in Prevention (I) and Recovery (R) by treatments. Mean invest-
ments in I and R measure the average of participants’ investment in prevention and
recovery. Median is derived from the median of average investments.
Prevention (I) Recovery (R)
Gain Mean 29.2 22.7
Median (28.6) (22.4)
Loss Mean 28.2 26.0
Median (31.1) (25.4)
We next consider Hypotheses 1 and 2. Given that the observations of preven-
tion and recovery are not independent, to assess the gain-loss treatment effect,
we take the average of participants investment in back up and recover and run
a bootstrap linear regression with robust standard errors. The regression results
are reported in Table 4. The effect of treatment on prevention is statistically
insignificant, whereas the effect on recovery is marginally lower in the gain treat-
ment (p < 0.1). This result provides some marginal support for Hypothesis 1.
There is no support for Hypothesis 2.
Result 2. The amount invested in prevention is the same in the gain and loss
treatments. Investment in recovery is marginally higher in the loss treatment
than in the gain treatment.
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Fig. 4. Box plot of average numbers of tokens invested in prevention (I), and recovery
(R and RCon).
Table 4. Bootstrap regression on back up and recovery investments by participants.
The unit observation is the average investment in recovery (R) and investment (I).
Independent variables include treatments framings and individual characteristics, ethi-
cal/financial risk taking attitudes, gender, age, first language English and average total
distance traveled in TSP games. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Recovery Prevention
Gain frame -6.059* -0.742
(3.182) (4.018)
Ethical-risk taking 1.036 -0.296
(3.203) (2.520)
Financial-risk taking -2.758 -3.827*
(2.403) (2.214)
Male -2.523 1.412
(3.757) (4.653)
Age -0.120 -0.0726
(0.688) (0.639)
English -4.348 -3.924
(3.697) (3.799)
Total Distance 0.0273 0.0235
(0.0873) (0.104)
Constant 28.02 33.77
(38.13) (42.87)
Observations 76 76
R-squared 0.071 0.057
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The average data (see Table 3) suggests that spending on prevention and
recovery is ‘in the middle’ of the permissible range. At the individual level, how-
ever, we see clustering at the extreme combinations (I,R) = (0, 0); (0, 50); (50, 0)
and (50, 50). For instance, Around 13% of subjects invest nothing in prevention
(11% in the gain treatment and 15% in the loss treatment) while 23% invest the
maximum amount (24% and 22%). Around 22% of subjects invest nothing in
recovery (29% and 16%) while 24% invest the maximum amount(20% and 27%).
To study individual behavior in more detail we classify behaviour into 5
categories detailed in Table 5. The categories are (1) prevention lover, who in-
vests in prevention not recovery, (2) recovery lover, who invests in recovery not
prevention, (3) payment lover, who invests in both prevention and recovery, (4)
payment averse, who invests in neither prevention nor recovery, (5) intermediate,
who invests ‘in the middle’ for both prevention and recovery.
Table 5. Classification of strategies.
I −R I +R
Prevention lover [25, 50] [25, 75]
Recovery lover [−50,−25] [25, 75]
Payment lover (−25, 25) [75, 100]
Payment averse (−25, 25) [0, 25]
Intermediate (−25, 25) (25, 75)
Figure 5 provides a scatter plot of the frequency of each combination of I
and R. We can see large clusters at payment lover, I = R = 50 and prevention
lover, I = 50, R = 0. There are also smaller clusters at no payment averse,
I = 0, R = 0, and recovery lover, I = 0, R = 50. A lot of subjects also fit in the
intermediate category. Overall, therefore, there is considerable heterogeneity in
how subjects behaved in the task. One interesting thing to observe is the near
symmetric split around I = R meaning that a large proportion of subjects invest
more in recovery than investment. This leads to our next result.
Result 3. There is large heterogeneity in individual behaviour with clustering
at the extremes of full prevention, no prevention or recovery, and maximum
recovery.
We finish the analysis by looking at how behaviour correlates with risk atti-
tudes. At the end of the experiment, we used the Domain Specific Risk Taking
Attitude Scale to elicit individual risk preferences. For the analysis we focus on
risk attitude in the financial domain. Subjects are defined as extreme risk averse
if their financial risk taking score is in the lower 25 percentile of all subjects
and extreme risk seeking if the score is in the upper 25 percentile. The average
investments in prevention and recovery is plotted in figure 6. There is marginal
evidence that risk averse individuals invest more in prevention (see also Table 4).
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Fig. 5. Scatter plot of aggregate choice distributions by difference between spending
on prevention and recovery versus total amount spent on prevention and recovery.
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There is also marginal evidence that the framing effect is larger for risk averse
individuals than risk seeking individuals.
Result 4. There is marginal evidence that risk averse individuals invest more in
prevention and are more influenced by framing than risk seeking individuals.
Fig. 6. Choice of back up and recovery by risk attitudes under gain and loss framing.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a simple game to explore the strategic trade-
off between prevention of a cyber-attack and recovery from a cyber-attack. This
game can be useful in examining situations such as ransomware in which an indi-
vidual can prevent attack (e.g. through off-line back-ups) or attempt to recover
from attack (e.g. by paying the ransom). We show that the optimal strategy
depends on risk attitudes. Our findings reinforce, therefore, the need to model
risk attitudes in security games [30]. We show that a risk averse individual will
invest in prevention while a risk loving individual will invest in recovery. We
know in the field that many individuals do pay ransom demands and so it is
interesting to explore the factors that influence this decision.
A particular factor we wished to explore is whether behavior is influenced by
framing. This is an important issue, in practical terms, for guiding the design
of cyber-awareness campaigns [31, 32]. We hypothesized that in a loss frame
individuals would be more risk loving and so invest in recovery. Conversely, in
a gain frame they would be more risk averse and so invest in prevention. This
is consistent with a reflection effect [13]. We ran an experiment to test this
prediction. While the framing effect we observed was in the predicted direction
it was small in magnitude. In short, framing seemed to make relatively little
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difference. This may be because the difference in our frames was ‘too subtle’ or
it could be that framing is difficult to manipulate in a cyber-security context.
In practical terms we hoped that a gain frame could increase investment in
prevention. The observed effect was marginal at best. This means that individ-
uals were relatively risk seeking. In particular, a large proportion of subjects
invested more in recovery than prevention. While this result might be disap-
pointing from a policy perspective it is arguably a reflection of the reality on
the ground. Indeed the risk seeking we observed in our experiment is above that
observed in standard lab experiments with a non cyber-security frame. This may
suggest individuals are more willing to take risks in cyber-space than other do-
mains. This is something we plan to test in future work by directly comparing a
cyber and neutral frame. One can also consider other settings with a prevention
and recovery dichotomy such as in health care (prevention versus treatment of
illness) and security (preventing theft versus recovering losses). It would also be
of interest to see how risk taking in our experiment compares with standardized
measures of risk taking [33]
More generally, we believe that the prevention and recovery game, and our
experimental design, offer a novel approach to explore cyber behavior. One pos-
sible extension is to embed the prevention stage within a network security game
in which the probability of attack depends on the actions of other users. Previous
work has modelled (what we have called the prevention stage) as a weakest-link,
best-shot, weakest-target and total effort games [3, 4, 34]. This adds strategic
uncertainty in that an individual also needs to take account of the actions of
others. Framing may have interesting influences on that strategic uncertainty in
changing the focal expectation [35, 36].
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